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Abstract
This article provides an empirical study of public engagement with climate change discourse in China by analysing how
Chinese publics participate in the public discussion around two Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports and
how individual users interact with state and elite actors on the pre-eminent Chinese microblogging platform Weibo. Using
social network analysis methods and a temporal comparison, we examine the structure of climate communication net-
works, the direction of information flows among multiple types of Weibo users, and the changes in information diffusion
patterns between the pre- and post-Paris periods. Our results show there is an increasing yet constrained form of public
engagement in climate communication on Weibo alongside China’s pro-environmental transition in recent years. We find
an expansion of public engagement as shown by individual users’ increasing influence in communication networks and the
diversification of frames associated with climate change discourse. However, we also find three restrictive interaction ten-
dencies that limit Weibo’s potential to facilitate multi-directional communication and open public deliberation of climate
change, including the decline of mutually balanced dialogic interactions, the lack of bottom-up information flows, and the
reinforcement of homophily tendencies amongst eco-insiders and governmental users. These findings highlight the coex-
istence of both opportunities and constraints of Weibo being a venue for public engagement with climate communication
and as a forum for a new climate politics and citizen participation in China.
Keywords
climate change communication; China; public engagement; social media; social network analysis
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Is There a New Climate Politics? Emergency, Engagement and Justice” edited by Anna R.
Davies (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland), Stephan Hügel (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland) and Vanesa Castán Broto (University
of Sheffield, UK).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Since its 13th Five-Year-Plan period (2016–2020), China
has undergone a pro-environmental transition and a
restructuring of its economy for greener growth. China—
currently the world’s largest emitter of CO2, and seen
as a ‘laggard’ in Copenhagen (Christoff, 2010)—has
recently taken a more proactive role in the global cli-
mate regime (see Engels, 2018; Roberts, 2011). China
pledged at COP21 to peak its emissions by 2030 and
announced in 2020 to further strengthen its target to
achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Domestically, these
pledges have translated into a series of rapid climate
policies and state-led programs, such as policies and
investments to boost renewable energies and the nation-
wide “Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction”
plan (State Council, 2011). Although China’s climate
responses remain largely insufficient to meet climate
targets, these initiatives demonstrate a positive shift
in China’s environmental orientation. Some observers
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highlight the significant role of the Chinese central
government in steering this pro-environmental transi-
tion. They attribute China’s environmental turnaround
to an authoritarian environmentalism model where a
non-participatory approach bypasses public ignorance,
conflicts of interest, and other factors that slow or hin-
der climate action (e.g., Beeson, 2018; Chen & Lees,
2018). However, recent studies have presented a more
nuanced image of China’s environmental governance.
Internal contestations among governmental agencies,
local authorities, and interest groups often exhibit a mix-
ture of both liberal and non-inclusive features in China’s
multi-level climate governance (e.g., Lo, 2015; Schreurs,
2017). Public participation, in its various forms, is increas-
ingly prevalent and effective in the practice of environ-
mental policy processes (see Wu, Ma, Bian, Li, & Yi, 2020).
Instead of relying on a strong state capacity to over-
ride contestation, successful environmental outcomes
are often a result of coordination among multiple stake-
holders (e.g., Huang, Castán Broto, Liu, & Ma, 2018).
These important nuances in China’s environmental
governance show us the need to study China’s climate
governance as a complex and evolving process and to
direct more attention to the interactions among state
and non-state actors across different settings. In this
study, we explore how such interactions among state,
elite, and individual actors unfold in the climate change
communication field.
Climate communication helps construct public imag-
inaries and promotes civic participation around climate
change. It is an important arena in which climate change
discourse is produced, reproduced, and transformed
(Carvalho, 2010; Carvalho, van Wessel, & Maeseele,
2017). A proliferating body of literature discusses both
the positive and negative roles of social media for online
discursive interaction and offline action around climate
change. However, despite the significance of China’s
actions (or inaction) in the global decarbonisation pro-
cess and the increasing penetration of social media in
Chinese society, little is known about the way in which cli-
mate change is communicated on Chinese social media
and the degree to which these channels can be lever-
aged for public engagement in climate politics. This study
looks into how climate communication is carried out on
Weibo, a premier social media platform and an impor-
tant space for public expressions in China. By analysing
the structure of communication networks and the direc-
tion of information flows in public discussions about the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth
IPCC Assessment Report (AR5; IPCC, 2014) and Special
Reports on Global Warming of 1.5 ºC (SR15; IPCC, 2018),
this study sheds light on the often black-boxed interac-
tion processes among state, elite, and individual actors
in building public discourse around climate change. Thus
we contribute to a better understanding of both the
potential and limitations of the Weibosphere for public
engagement in China’s new climate politics.
2. Literature Review
Public engagement with climate change is a multi-
faceted notion that comprises cognitive, affective, and
behavioural dimensions (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, &
Whitmarsh, 2007). Climate communication plays an
important role in many of these facets. Communication
helps to create discursive conditions for public engage-
ment as it shapes people’s perceptions of and attitudes
towards climate change. Discursive interactions in cli-
mate communication also provide important venues for
the construction of people’s political subjectivity in act-
ing on climate change (Carvalho, 2010; Carvalho et al.,
2017). A core tenet of public engagement is the promo-
tion of two-way information exchange that enable multi-
perspective inputs and mutual-learning (Rowe & Frewer,
2005). Such multi-directional interactions are particu-
larly important in addressing climate change. Being a
complex issue situated at the intersections between eco-
logical, economic, political, and social systems, its causes
and impacts involve an extraordinarily diverse array of
stakeholders. Climate mitigation and adaptation demand
coordination between various motivations for (and barri-
ers to) making changes (Baber & Bartlett, 2005). In light
of this, a crucial objective of climate communication is
to provide a public space in which actors can present,
deliberate, and negotiate their diverse and sometimes
contested interests around climate change (Stevenson &
Dryzek, 2014).
A rich body of literature discusses how social media
bring in opportunities for—and also challenges to—such
multi-directional interactions in disseminating knowl-
edge, shaping public perceptions, coordinating pub-
lic engagement, and mobilizing political participation
around climate change (e.g., O’Neill & Boykoff, 2012;
Pearce, Brown, Nerlich, & Koteyko, 2015; Segerberg
& Bennett, 2011). However, this body of literature
has a noticeable geographical bias as it is largely
based on developed Western societies, particularly the
Twittersphere (Pearce, Niederer, Özkula, & Sánchez
Querubín, 2019). In the Twitter context, climate com-
munication has been studied from various perspec-
tives, including user-centred research on information
exchange, content-based research on themes and senti-
ments, and reflexive discussions about its technological,
social, and political potentials (for a review, see Pearce
et al., 2019; Schäfer, 2012). There is, as yet, only a hand-
ful of studies looking into how climate communication
plays out on China’s Weibo (e.g., Liu & Zhao, 2017; Riley,
Wang, Wang, & Feng, 2016).
Although few Weibo studies are specified in cli-
mate communication, research on Weibo’s role in civic
communication is proliferating. As an important alter-
native space for public discourse in China, Weibo pro-
vides a conduit for presenting voices that were once
absent from China’s state-operated mass media system
allowing them to be debated in public discussion. Even
though this process is not free from political, market, or
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algorithm interference, it still introduces positive dynam-
ics into state–society interaction in China (Gu, 2014;
Lewis, 2013; Sullivan, 2013; Wang & Shi, 2018; Zhang
& Lin, 2014). In the environmental field, many studies
focus on civil society organizations to investigate how
Weibo is leveraged to raise public environmental aware-
ness, facilitate environmental advocacy, and mobilise
(non-confrontational) civic action (e.g., Huang, Gui, &
Sun, 2015; Zhang & Skoric, 2020). Researchers also note
the positive translation of online public opinion to envi-
ronmental policies. A good example is the public debate
over air pollution: ignited and escalated on Weibo, this
nationwide debate made air pollution a highly visible
issue on China’s political agenda and eventually led to
factory relocation and industrial reform (see Fedorenko
& Sun, 2016). In this light, Weibo is often discussed as an
enabling space for the environmental movement and a
green public sphere (Liu, 2011; Sima, 2011; Yang, 2009)
in China.
However, consistent with critiques of the rigidity of
the Habermasian public sphere (e.g., Fraser, 1990), some
scholars question whether the public sphere notion fits
the complicated and dynamic reality of civic commu-
nication in China, where the boundary between state
and society is often blurred (Huang, 1993). While many
researchers cite censorship as the main reason to ques-
tion Weibo’s political potential, we caution that the inter-
action between the state and the public on Weibo is
more complex than a simple oppression–empowerment
dichotomy. The situation on the ground varies across
different fields and different levels of political sensitiv-
ity. King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) showed that censor-
ship is only limited to curtailing mobilisation of subver-
sive collective action. Rauchfleisch and Schäfer (2015)
also found multiple public spheres exit on Weibo and
the one associated with environmental issues features
a high degree of open criticism and has large-scale
participation. In relation to the broader environmen-
tal governance, there is also a nuanced body of lit-
erature showing complex interplays between the cen-
tral authority and local agencies (e.g., Lo, 2015), and
between state actors and civil society (e.g., Wu, Chang,
Yilihamu, & Zhou, 2017). Van Rooij, Stern, and Fürst
(2016) observed that a host of new environmental actors
has risen and diversified China’s environmental regula-
tory landscape. Relatedly, scholars have also noted the
increasing use of deliberative measures in China’s envi-
ronmental policy processes (Mol & Carter, 2006; Zhang,
He, Mol, & Zhu, 2013). These nuances resonate with
what He and Warren (2011) called the deliberative turn
in China’s political development, where public feedback
and participation are increasingly incorporated into gov-
ernance practice.
These important nuances in China’s environmental
politics show the need to move beyond a binary view
and to direct more research attention toward the inter-
action process among state, elite, and individual actors.
This article explores such interaction processes in the
important yet under-researched field of climate commu-
nication in China.
We focus on Weibo-mediated public discussions
around the IPCC AR5 and SR15 reports. As significant
milestones and structuring forces in the development
of the international climate regime, IPCC reports are
important drivers of media visibility and public debate
over climate change (Broadbent et al., 2016). These
documents are also important objects in the ‘science-
policy interface’ of the global climate regime because
they work to produce the consensus position on cli-
mate science and shape climate policy development
(Howe, 2014). In the Twitter context, previous studies
have examined the communication of IPCC reports on
several aspects, including the dominant frames (O’Neill,
Williams, Kurz, Wiersma, & Boykoff, 2015), topics and
communities (Pearce, Holmberg, Hellsten, & Nerlich,
2014), the divergence and interaction between differ-
ent communities (Holmberg & Hellsten, 2016), and scien-
tific knowledge translation among stakeholders (Yagodin,
Tegelberg, Medeiros, & Russell, 2016). Newman (2016)
studied the spreading of IPCC AR5 on Twitter and found
non-elite actors attracted the most attention in pub-
lic discussions. His study suggested opportunities on
Twitter for non-traditional voices to reach large audi-
ences. By contrast, in the Weibo context, Liu and Zhao’s
study (2017) on the public discussion around the Paris
Summit presented a rather bleak picture for public
engagement on Weibo. Based on the number of reposts,
they argued climate communication on Weibo is dom-
inated by institutional actors, particularly state-owned
media and government agencies. However, we argue
that climate communication on Weibo is more nuanced
than this image of institutional actors’ domination. User
influence on social media is a multifaceted notion that
may not be sufficiently captured by a single indicator
such as repost quantity. In this study, we extend previous
research findings by investigating user influence from a
relational perspective.
Using social network analysis (SNA) methods, we
study public engagement in climate communication on
Weibo by focusing on information flows and interaction
processes among different types of users. Specifically,
we ask the following questions: Who participates in the
spreading of the AR5 and the SR15 reports on Weibo?
To what extent does information flow in a top-down or
bottom-up manner? What factors contribute to users’
tendencies to participate in the AR5 and SR15 pub-
lic discussions? We also include a temporal dimension
in our analysis to compare the climate communication
networks between the AR5 and SR15 periods. Since
these two reports were respectively published before
and after the pivot in China’s environmental orienta-
tion, comparing these two periods can shed light on
how public engagement has developed alongside China’s
pro-environmental transition. By offering an empirical
assessment of the interaction structure between state,
elite, and individual actors, this study contributes to the
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literature of climate communication and public engage-
ment in China’s new eco-politics.
3. Methodology
We collected publicly accessible Weibo posts contain-
ing the keyword ‘IPCC报告’ (IPCC reports) within 16
months of each report’s release (2013 September–2015
January for AR5 and 2018 October–2020 February for
SR15). We only focused on original user-generated posts
(AR5 n = 1709, SR15 n = 2505). Figure 1 illustrates the
distributions of these posts over weeks. For both reports,
public attention was mostly concentrated within a short
time immediately after their release. Nevertheless, both
reports were discussed persistently over the 16-month
timespan and re-attracted public attention with the sub-
sequent publication of related documents.
We used SNA to examine user interactions in pub-
lic discussions on Weibo. SNA is a family of methods
that draw on network and graph theory to investigate
social structures. Unlike standard statistical techniques
that reduce the social world to aggregates of discrete
individuals and examine social behaviours as a function
of individuals’ attributes, SNA treats actors as ‘agents-
in-relation’ and considers the effects of both individuals’
attributes and the relational structure in which they are
embedded (Crossley, 2011). Such a relational perspec-
tive is particularly useful for our study since information
on social media is generated by users (agents) and travels
through their online connections (relation).
We extracted all usernames involved in reposting
relations and collected their publicly accessible user pro-
file data. There were 316 such users in the AR5 period
and 701 in the SR15 period. While these users only repre-
sent a very small fraction of the vast Weibosphere, they
are nevertheless a meaningful sample for our relation-
focused analysis because our primary interest is on users’
interaction patterns rather than users per se. Based on
users’ reposting relationships, we constructed directed
and valued networks (as shown in Figure 2) to depict the
structure of information dissemination, with nodes rep-
resenting users, directed edges showing the directions
of information flows, and edge values indicating the fre-
quencies of reposting relationships.
Our examination consisted of two levels of analysis:
We first descriptively analysed user demographics, the
content of top posts, and network-level structures to pro-
vide an overview of public discussions. We then exam-
ined the structure of communication networks using
exponential random graph models (Robins, Pattison,
Kalish, & Lusher, 2007). As a statistical tool designed to
tackle network data, exponential random graph models
allows us to model the probability of relationships in
networks as a function of both the individuals’ social
attributes and the network’s structural properties. This
helps us examine the structure of information flows
between different types of users and identify the factors
that affect their likelihood of spreading climate messages
on Weibo.
Specifically, we tested three groups of factors. The
first two groups address the notion of elite-ness in cli-
mate communication. We used multiple factors in our
models to represent its different conceptualizations. We
distinguished three types of ‘elite’ users based on their
digital social statuses (users were considered high digital
social status if their follower sizes are above the median
of all sample users in the respective periods), interests
in climate science or environmentalism (users were con-
sidered as science-affiliated or environmental concerned
if their Weibo profiles contain related keywords), and
account types (as indicated in Weibo’s official verifica-
tion system). The third group of factors explore two net-
work structural effects that have particular implications
for public engagement in climate communication.
To test these factors, we built three sets of expo-
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Figure 1. IPCC-related Weibo posts distribution by week since release. Notes: AR5: 27 September 2013 to 30 January 2015;
SR15: 8 October 2018 to 10 February 2020.
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Figure 2. Overview of AR5 network (left) and SR15 network (right), in ForceAtlas2 layout (Jacomy, Venturini, Heymann, &
Bastian, 2014).
hypotheses. The first group of hypotheses examines indi-
viduals’ attributes. Since a higher status indicates a larger
potential audience group on Weibo, we expected a posi-
tive effect of a larger follower size on both sending out
and receiving climate messages: H1 users with a large
number of followers are more likely to (a) be reposted
and (b) repost others. We then tested the effect of being
eco-insiders on users’ reposting behaviour. Previous
studies found internet use promotes citizen participation
mainly among those who already have a high interest
in or knowledge of relevant issues (see e.g., Min, 2010).
We expected a similar positive effect in climate commu-
nication so that science-affiliated and environmentally
concerned users would be more active than laypeople in
obtaining and spreading climate messages: H2 science-
affiliated users are more likely to be (a) information
senders and (b) information receivers; H3 environmen-
tally concerned users are more likely to be (a) informa-
tion senders and (b) information receivers.
The second group of hypotheses examines the direc-
tion of information flows between individual users and
four types of organizational users. Since China’s climate
responses are often seen as featuring a top-down char-
acter, we expected the same mechanism to be mirrored
in the communication area so the AR5 and SR15 infor-
mation would flow from organizational users to indi-
vidual users: H4 organizational users, including (a) gov-
ernment, (b) media, (c) business, (d) education, and
(e) civil society organizations, are more likely to be infor-
mation providers for individual users. We also tested
whether there is a bottom-up information diffusion pat-
tern: H5 individual users are more likely to provide infor-
mation for organizational users, including (a) govern-
ment, (b) media, (c) business, (d) education, and (e) civil
society organizations.
The third group of hypotheses explores two types
of network effects. The first is a pair-wise propensity:
H6 users tend to form mutually balanced communica-
tion relationships by reposting those who have reposted
themselves. This mutually balanced form of interac-
tion is important to foster mutual-learning in climate
communication. The second network influence is the
homophily effect. Homophily describes people’s ten-
dency to interact mostly with those who are similar
to themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).
This effect has particular relevance in climate commu-
nication as it may limit individuals to selective informa-
tion sources, thus creating echo-chambers which lead
to opinion segregation and polarization (see, e.g., Jang
& Hart, 2015). Previous studies revealed that strong
homophily exists between climate activist and scep-
tic groups on Twitter and that this escalates parti-
san polarization over climate policies, as illustrated in
U.S.-oriented research (Carmichael, Brulle, & Huxster,
2017; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Lambert, 2015).
Within the Chinese context, our primary interest was the
potential cleavage between the state/elite actors and
the general public, so we tested whether a homophily
effect exists among eco-insiders and various institutional
users: H7 there is a statistically significant homophily
effect amongst eco-insiders (i.e., environmentally con-
cerned and science-affiliated users) and H8 there is a
statistically significant homophily effect amongst orga-
nizational users, including those from (a) government,
(b) media, (c) business, (d) education, and (e) civil soci-
ety organizations.
Since our primary interest in this part of the analy-
sis is the structure of information flows rather than the
strength of users’ relationships, we dichotomized the
communication networks based on the presence (1) or
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absence (0) of the reposting relationship between user
pairs. Self-loops were also excluded as reposting oneself
has little meaning for information diffusion. Models were
estimated using the R package ‘ergm’ (Hunter, Handcock,
Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008).
4. Results
4.1. Expansion of Public Engagement: Scale,
Participants, and Network Overview
From the AR5 to the SR15 period, more people partici-
pated in public discussion and actively engaged in inter-
actions with others, as well as more diverse frames asso-
ciated with climate change on Weibo. We saw increases
in the average numbers of reposts (from 12.54 in AR5
to 18.61 in SR15), comments (5.46 to 16.93), and likes
(4.44 to 26.91). The portion of non-monologic posts (i.e.,
those with at least one reposting) also increased from
16.96% in AR5 to 26.63% in SR15. We also examined
the content of the top 1% most widely circulated posts
in each period (AR5 n = 17, SR15 n = 25). Figure 3
shows the themes which emerged from these top posts.
We found early discussions focused on describing and
understanding climate change, including news about the
release of AR5, the projected climate scenarios, global
impacts, infographics, and debates over settled versus
uncertain science. This is consistent with Liu and Zhao’s
(2017) study, which found that Weibo discussions dur-
ing the Paris Summit period were primarily about raising
public awareness, and climate change was mostly pre-
sented as a global threat with little relevance to China’s
national context. However, we saw new developments
in the SR15 period. Themes in SR15 discussions became
more specific, argumentative, and domestically oriented,
covering issues such as the impact on local environments
and livelihoods, the urgency of mitigation and adapta-
tion action, low-carbon development for national inter-
ests, and debate over developed countries’ historical car-
bon debts.
Table 1 compares the network-level descriptive statis-
tics between AR5 and SR15, which shows more detailed
changes to communication networks. As indicated by the
larger numbers of nodes, edges, diameter, and average
path length, the SR15 network had more participants,
more reposting relations, and longer information diffu-
sion chains than the AR5 network. However, three vital
changes can be observed beneath this overall expan-
sion pattern. First, the intensity of interactions decreased
from the AR5 to SR15 period as the network density
dropped from 0.31% to 0.14%. Second, the contradic-
tion between the increased average degree and the
decreased average weighted degree indicates that while
individual users may interact with more people on aver-
age, they were less likely to interact recurrently or main-
tain their relationships over time. Third, as shown by
the decrease in modularity, the SR15 network had fewer
closely-knit clusters and presented a flatter structure
than the AR5 network. Together, these network-level
changes show that expansion of the network’s scale did
not bring a proportionate growth in interaction intensity.
While the communication networks expanded from the
AR5 to SR15 periods, interactions on networks became
less dense, less recursive, and less clustered.
Another important trend identified by the network-
level comparison is the popularization of climate com-
munication on Weibo. The shares of eco-insiders, users
located in China’s wealthy developed areas, and those
with higher online social statuses dropped significantly
from the AR5 to SR15 period. Conversely, there was
increased engagement by users from the lay public,
underdeveloped regions, and those with lower online
social statuses. The popularization trend is also reflected
by the rising influence of individual users. We consider
Figure 3. Content themes in the top 1% most circulated posts in the AR5 period (left) and the SR15 period (right). Notes:
A larger square size indicates a higher theme frequency. A darker colour indicates a larger total repost number. A post may
contain multiple themes.
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Table 1. Network-level descriptive statistics of the AR5 and SR15 communication networks.
AR5 SR15
General Structure
n of edges 312 694
n of nodes 316 701
avg. degree 0.81 0.91
avg. weighted degree 1.34 1.26
density 0.31% 0.14%
diameter 5 7
avg. path length 1.79 2.24
modularity a 0.87 0.76
User Profile n % n %
environmentalist 48 15.18% 49 7.08%
science-affiliated 71 22.46% 43 6.21%
official verification 133 42.08% 147 21.24%
developed area 116 36.7% 231 33.38%















Central Nodes b weighted degree betweenness weighted degree betweenness
state/elite 30% 25% 20% 5%
public individual 25% 45% 65% 85%
Notes: a Modularity using the Louvain algorithm (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008); b The top 20 nodes by centralities.
users as influential if they reached a large audience (mea-
sured by weighted degree centrality) or bridged informa-
tion flows between many others (measured by between-
ness centrality). Focusing on the top 20 nodes with the
highest weighted degree and betweenness centralities,
we found more individual users became influential in the
SR15 period whereas the share of elite users (e.g., gov-
ernmental organizations, state-run media, people with
official backgrounds) in these central positions dropped
significantly over time. Overall, we saw that more individ-
uals from the general public participated in information
diffusion and had more opportunities to reach or bridge
large audiences in the SR15 network.
4.2. Limitations to Public Engagement: The Direction of
Information Flows
While the analysis above shows a general expansion of
public engagement, a more nuanced picture emerged
when we used exponential random graph models to
examine interaction processes and information flows
between state, elite, and individual users. The modelling
results are provided in Table 2. All models successfully
converged and fitted the data well (see the Supplement-
ary File for goodness-of-fit and convergence statistics).
In Model 1, we examined the interaction pattern
of three types of elite users, including those with high
online social status (H1) and those involved in climate
science (H2) or environmentalism (H3). We found differ-
ent types of elite users played different roles in infor-
mation diffusion. First, in both AR5 and SR15 networks,
those with a large number of followers were always more
likely to send information to, and less likely to receive
information from, users with a small number of followers.
Second, eco-insider’s roles changed over time: Science-
affiliated users, who tended to be active in both send-
ing and receiving information in the AR5 period, were
less active in receiving information in the SR15 period.
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Table 2. Exponential random graph models results of the AR5 and SR15 communication networks.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AR5 SR15 AR5 SR15 AR5 SR15
Individual Terms
fans_large (in) −1.26*** (0.25) −1.39*** (0.23)
fans_large (out) 0.59*** (0.15) 1.23*** (0.11)
science (in) 0.77** (0.24) −0.49 (0.40)
science (out) 0.21** (0.07) 2.18*** (0.08)
enviro (in) −0.13 (0.29) 0.78** (0.27)
enviro (out) 0.2** (0.08) −0.06 (0.16)
Dyadic Terms




gov 0.03 (0.16) −0.03 (0.21)
media 0.29* (0.12) 3.44*** (0.08)
bottom-up flow
civil −0.93† (0.52)
edu 0.65 (0.74) −2.03*** (0.55)
gov 0.04 (0.38) −2.50*** (0.34)
media −0.66 (0.43) −2.17*** (0.54)
homophily
insider 0.41* (0.17) 1.77*** (0.19)
laypeople −0.31* (0.12) −1.95*** (0.09)
civil 2.25** (0.75)
gov 1.42† (0.78) 1.65*** (0.38)
media 2.09*** (0.63) 0.15 (0.75)
individual −0.02 (0.26) −0.28 (0.20)
Baseline
edges −4.79*** (0.23) −7.47*** (0.15) −4.39*** (0.14) −7.00*** (0.10) −4.21*** (0.56) −5.50*** (0.29)
in-degree (1) 2.07*** (0.17) 2.85*** (0.15) 1.83*** (0.14) 2.77*** (0.12) 1.84*** (0.14) 3.32*** (0.15)
out-degree (0) 5.98*** (0.46) 6.59*** (0.43) 6.33*** (0.45)
out-degree (1) 3.79*** (0.38) 4.11*** (0.37) 3.96*** (0.38)
Model Fit
AIC 3226 8448 3327 8199 3304 7913
BIC 3331 8548 3432 8288 3438 8023
Notes: † p  <  0.10; * p  <  0.05; ** p  <  0.01; *** p  <  0.00. There were not enough observations of interactions between individual
users with the civil society organization group in the SR15 period and the education group in AR5, so their corresponding dyadic terms
were dropped in Model 2 and Model 3. Two out-degree controlling terms were added in AR5 models to better fit the data and improve
model convergence.
By contrast, while environmentally concerned users
tended to be information providers in the AR5 period,
they took on more of an audience role in the SR15 period
as they became more active in receiving information.
In Model 2, we examined the direction of informa-
tion flows between organizational users and individual
users (H4 and H5). We found the diffusion of climate
change information on Weibo tended to follow a top-
down pattern. As the second block of Table 2 shows,
while individual users tended to receive information
from civil society organizations in the AR5 period, edu-
cational organizations in the SR15 periods, and media
organizations in both periods, none of the organization
types tended to obtain information from individual users.
In the SR15 network, there were even fewer bottom -up
flows from individual users to education, governmental,
or media users than one would expect by chance. Overall,
we found the top-down pattern of information diffu-
sion was reinforced over time and individual accounts
became less likely to be reposted by organizational
accounts in climate communication on Weibo. However,
this top-down trajectory shows a divergence from Liu
and Zhao’s previous study (2017), which found that gov-
ernmental and media users dominated climate commu-
nication on Weibo. Our network analysis shows govern-
mental users were not influential information providers
for individual users. Instead, only the media users (includ-
ing mainstream, private, and independent types) played
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a significant role in spreading information to individual
users in climate communication on Weibo.
Model 3 tests two network effects. We found the
reciprocity effect (H6) was statistically significant only
in the AR5 period. The decrease of mutually balanced
relations signals a recent decline in interactive conver-
sations in climate communication on Weibo. This may
reflect a broader shift of interaction patterns on Weibo
towards spreading messages rather than promoting dia-
logue and opinion exchange. When testing homophily
effects, we found eco-insiders (H7) tended to communi-
cate in more closed circles amongst themselves in both
periods, whereas users from the general public were
more likely to jump out of their circle and obtain infor-
mation from eco-insiders. We saw a low risk of informa-
tion cleavage for most organizational types except for
governmental users (H8). While there was a homophily
tendency within civil society and media organizations
in the AR5 period, it was no longer statistically signifi-
cant in the SR15 period. However, governmental users’
homophily tendency was reinforced over time. Since
closed communication circles often lead to information
cleavage, reinforce people’s existing opinions, and exac-
erbate divergences between groups, the homophily ten-
dencies amongst eco-insiders and governmental users
may obstruct them from participating in meaningful pub-
lic deliberation on Weibo. Furthermore, we noted a hier-
archical pattern among governmental users. Figure 4
shows an example from the SR15 network. Within this
governmental users’ cluster, information flows hierar-
chically from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment
to provincial- and lower-level local environmental pro-
tection bureaus, then to subsidiary public organizations
and non-state actors. This hierarchical chain provides an
example of how a top-down form of environmentalism
manifests itself in the communication domain.
5. Discussion
Our findings show both opportunities and limitations
for climate communication on Weibo alongside China’s
pro-environmental transition in recent years. From the
AR5 to SR15 period, there was a general expansion
of public engagement and popularization trends in
climate communication on Weibo, as shown by the
increased number of participants, diversified climate
change frames, and increased influence of individual
users in bridging information flows. We examined users’
dominance from a relational perspective and found that
non-elite individual users became more influential in
climate information diffusion on Weibo. Our exponen-
tial random graph models results provide more nuances
to the general popularization trend. Firstly, we found
information flows in climate communication on Weibo
largely followed a top-down pattern. Media accounts
were the most prominent information source for indi-
viduals, whereas the governmental users’ role to indi-



















































Figure 4. A hierarchic governmental user cluster in the SR15 network. Notes: Left: the whole SR15 network. Right: a gov-
ernmental user cluster. Node sizes indicate weighted degrees; node colours indicate hierarchic levels; edge arrows show
the directions of information flow. Non-state actors’ usernames have been anonymized to protect privacy.
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three types of elite users studied in our models, only
the environmental user group showed a high proba-
bility of obtaining information from the general public
users. Those with more followers and those affiliated
with climate science tended to play the role of informa-
tion sources in climate communication. We also found
several trends that limit Weibo’s potential for facilitat-
ing multi-directional public engagement in climate com-
munication, including the decrease of interaction inten-
sity, the decline of mutually-balanced dialogues, the rein-
forcement of top-down diffusion pattern, and persistent
homophily tendencies amongst eco-insiders and govern-
mental users.
These findings present a mixed picture of the inter-
action process among state, elite, and individual actors,
which helps us to reconsider Weibo’s role in climate com-
munication. Social media’s potential for public engage-
ment and political participation derives from the interac-
tivity and connectivity embedded in their techno-social
infrastructure. While interactivity enables people to be
engaged in multi-directional opinion exchanges and pub-
lic deliberation, connectivity generates ‘mediated public
connection’ (Couldry, Livingstone, & Markham, 2007)
that allows fragmented individual conversations, expe-
riences, and beliefs to be consolidated into public dis-
courses and collective values. Despite the theoretical
potential, the degree to which interactivity and con-
nectivity translate into opportunities for public engage-
ment varies across different contexts. First, we have
to ask who the public are: The actors that constitute
‘the public’ in climate politics are not a homogenous or
unified whole (Whitmarsh, O’Neill, & Lorenzoni, 2013).
Instead, there are a nexus of multiple publics (Fraser,
1990) who interpret climate change, each with their
own vested interests, perceptions, and ‘cultural compe-
tencies’ (Burgess, Harrison, & Maiteny, 1991). Second,
complexity also arises from the structure of interac-
tions. While some interactions create bridging and bond-
ing opportunities that translate connectivity into social
capital, other interactions produce restrictive structures.
Therefore, in our analysis, we first distinguished Weibo
users by their types, online social status, and their inter-
est or involvement in climate science and eco-protection.
We then examined the structure of their interactions and
the direction of information flows in this structure to
discuss Weibo’s potential to facilitate open and multi-
directional communication. Our empirical results pre-
sented the process and complexity in Weibo interaction
from a relational network perspective, thus contributing
to the ongoing debate about both the potential for and
limitations of leveraging social media for public engage-
ment with climate change.
Our analyses show both enabling opportunities and
constraining conditions on Weibo. While we do find signs
of Weibo’s democratizing potential as a green public
sphere (Yang, 2009), we also see how greater participa-
tion may not translate into political efficacy in terms of
the ability of citizen voices to reach elite state actors.
Such a coexistence between the expansion of public
engagement and the top-down information diffusion pat-
tern in climate communication resonates with the notion
that the Chinese political sphere is undergoing a shift,
becoming more ‘responsive’ (Mertha, 2009), where pub-
lic participation is increasingly incorporated into environ-
mental governance, but public participation does not
challenge the centrality of state elite actors. This mixed
image suggests that Weibo does not necessarily lead to a
more autonomous or bottom-up climate politics, but nei-
ther does it simply maintain official and elite users’ dom-
inance in shaping the public discourse of climate change.
This two-sided image highlights the limitation of view-
ing Weibo as a normative Habermasian public sphere
in China’s eco-politics. China’s environmental movement
and governance are characterised by an interpenetration
between the state and the civil society (Ho & Edmonds,
2007). Therefore, to better understand China’s climate
politics, we have to move beyond a dualistic view that
rests on a binary opposition between state and civil soci-
ety, and direct more attention to the processes through
which state and civil society interact, as well as their con-
texts and dynamics.
This study is subjected to several limitations. First,
the size of the dataset we examined was limited by our
choice to focus on public discussions around IPCC reports
rather than climate change in general. Although study-
ing this specific topic allows us to focus on the core con-
ceptions of climate change, these event-triggered dis-
cussions cannot fully represent how climate change is
discussed in everyday life. Future studies would bene-
fit from a larger dataset that includes more issue- and
theme-based public discussions to capture a more com-
prehensive picture of climate change discourse. Second,
we measured users’ influence by their degree of central-
ity in communication networks. While node centralities
are important indicators of prominence in network analy-
sis, users’ influence in communication is nevertheless a
multifaceted concept. Future research will benefit from
incorporating other indicators to gauge different aspects
of communicative influence. Relatedly, we focused on
the process of information diffusion through sharing rela-
tionships. There are other important dimensions of com-
munication. Particularly, future studies could focus on
the ideational content in climate communication and the
quality of deliberation by conducting an in-depth qualita-
tive analysis of public discussions.
6. Conclusion
This article provides an empirical study of public engage-
ment with climate change discourse in China by analysing
the information flows among state, elite, and individ-
ual users in public discussions around two IPCC reports
on China’s prominent social media platform Weibo. Our
results show there is an increasing yet constrained form
of public engagement in climate communication on
Weibo. We find public engagement expanded alongside
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China’s recent pro-environmental transition as individual
users became increasingly influential in initiating public
discussions and disseminating climate messages in com-
munication networks. Relatedly, we observe a popular-
ization trend of the climate change discourse as shown
by the diversification of participants and frames in public
discussions. Conversely, we found three restrictive inter-
action patterns that highlight the limitations of Weibo
as a space for a new climate politics in China. First,
the decline of mutually balanced dialogic interactions
reduces Weibo’s potential to facilitate meaningful pub-
lic deliberation around climate change. Second, the lack
of bottom-up information flows indicates a deficit of pub-
lic feedback and input, which limits Weibo’s potential for
facilitating genuine multi-directional communication in
public engagement. Third, closed communication circles
amongst eco-insiders and governmental users may con-
fine them to selective information and opinions, create
cleavages between these elite users and the general pub-
lic, and thus obstruct mutual-learning and open opinion
exchange in climate communication.
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